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THE NATURAL FLOW OF IDEAS: WHY THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT TAKINGS CLAUSE AND AN OBSCURE WATER-
RIGHTS DECISION MIGHT THWART ATTEMPTS AT
STREAMLINING THE PATENT QUEUE
Joseph Kamien*
INTRODUCTION
As Abraham Lincoln once said, “In the world’s history certain inventions and
discoveries occurred of peculiar value, on account of their great efficiency in
facilitating all other inventions and discoveries. Of these were the art of writing and
of printing, the discovery of America, and the introduction of patent laws.”1 Certainly,
the American patent system has tremendously facilitated American inventiveness,
and has therefore benefitted the American economy and improved standard of living.2
However, this system is currently faced with a significant problem: a massive backlog
of unexamined applications.3 As a result, patent applications often languish for long
periods of time, thereby decreasing the rate at which technology progresses and
reducing the incentive to invest in innovation.4 Against this backdrop, the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) may grant “petitions to make special,”
which allow applications to be examined out of turn.5 The USPTO has also proposed
formalizing this procedure by creating three separate patent application tracks.6
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1 Abraham Lincoln, Lecture: Discoveries, Inventions and Improvements (Feb. 22, 1860),
in COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN (John G. Nicolay & John Hay eds., 1905).
2 See Bridging the Tax Gap: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 108th Cong. 2
(2004) (statement of Nick Godici, Comm’r of Patents for the U.S. Dep’t of Commerce),
available at http://finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/072104ngtest.pdf. But see Andrew W.
Torrance & Bill Tomlinson, Patents and the Regress of Useful Arts, 10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH.
L. REV. 130, 132 (2009) (arguing that a system of patent laws does not actually spur
technological innovation).
3 See Courtney Rubin, What Happened to Your Patent Application?, INC.COM (May 7,
2010), http://www.inc.com/news/articles/2010/05/patent-office-backlog-hurting-startups.html
(describing the deleterious impact of the patent office backlog on small businesses).
4 See id.
5 37 C.F.R. § 1.102(c) (2011).
6 Press Release 10-24, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce,
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This Note will examine the question of whether a place in the patent application
queue of the USPTO could be considered property. This is an important question,
because if it could be considered property, then granting a petition to make special
could be considered a taking under the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, and therefore require the payment of “just compensation.”7 This is an
especially relevant time to answer this question because, under the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act, the USPTO is currently in the process of replacing the current
one-queue-for-all model with the aforementioned three-track model.8 Consequently,
advancement out of turn is becoming a part of the normal application system, rather
than a sporadic occurrence.9
When answering the question of whether a place in the patent queue could be
property, it is important to keep in mind Justice Holmes’s assertion that law is
nothing more than “[t]he prophecies of what the courts will do in fact.”10 Thus, the
important question is not whether, in the abstract, a petition to make special would
be considered a taking. Instead, the important question is whether a future Court of
Federal Claims might find a petition to make special to be a taking, and whether
such a decision is likely to be overruled.11
To answer this question, this Note will describe the Court of Federal Claims’s
decision in Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States,12 which dealt
with water rights and endangered species in California.13 This decision has been
heavily criticized,14 but has not been overruled.15 Part II will give an overview of the
USPTO Proposes to Establish Three Patent Processing Tracks (June 3, 2010), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2010/10_24.jsp.
7 U.S. CONST. amend. V. In addition to requiring “just compensation,” this amendment
also requires that such takings be for “public use.” Id.
8 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 § 11(h), 125 Stat. 284
(2011); Press Release 10-24, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, supra note 6; Michael Cronin,
America Invents Act Provides a “Fast Track” Through the Patent Office, WISCONSIN
TECHNOLOGY NETWORK (Oct. 21, 2011), http://wtnnews.com/articles/9128/. The USPTO
originally planned to begin accepting requests to move applications to Track I in May of
2011, but due to funding restrictions it changed the date to September 26, 2011. Changes
to Implement the Prioritized Examination Track (Track I) of the Enhanced Examination
Timing Control Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. 59,050 (Sept. 23, 2011) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 1).
9 Id.
10 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897).
11 See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2011) (granting the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction to hear
claims against the United States that are “founded . . . upon the Constitution”).
12 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001).
13 Id.
14 See, e.g., Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 538 (2005)
(“[W]ith all due respect, Tulare appears to be wrong on some counts, incomplete in others
and, distinguishable, at all events.”). But see Jesse W. Barton, Note, Tulare Lake Basin
Water Storage District v. United States: Why It Was Correctly Decided and What This
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Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause and describe the Tulare decision. Part III will
then go through a hypothetical case in which a plaintiff attempts to use this decision
persuasively to seek just compensation for the loss of priority in the patent queue.
Part III.C will explain why it is rational to apply the reasoning from a water rights
decision to one concerning patent rights by showing how modern water rights law
and modern patent rights law both evolved to solve the same problems, and how
both have the same symbolic underpinnings. Part III.D will then address the four
biggest counterarguments. This Note will conclude that the USPTO can likely go
ahead with the new system without worrying about a constitutional problem, and will
provide suggestions about what the USPTO can do to minimize the threat of litigation.
I. THE USPTO APPLICATION PROCESS AND THE PROPOSED CHANGE
A. Background Information on the Current USPTO Application Process
Under the current system, anyone may apply for a United States patent.16 The
USPTO normally examines applications on a first-come, first-served basis,17
although an application may be assigned a filing date that is earlier than the actual
date the paperwork was received by the USPTO.18 All non-provisional applications
must contain a specification, any necessary drawings, and at least one claim.19 If a
claim fails to meet a procedural requirement of the USPTO, then the USPTO will
Means for Water Rights, 25 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 109 (2002) (arguing that Tulare
was correctly decided).
15 A later court did, however, find fault with the method used to calculate just
compensation. See Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 624
(2004). Additionally, another court found that a subsequent Supreme Court decision, Tahoe-
Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002),
“clarified takings law so as to require a different result” than Tulare. Casitas Mun. Water
Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Tahoe-Sierra, though, never
explicitly mentioned or discussed Tulare. See 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
16 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
17 37 C.F.R. § 1.102(a) (2011).
18 35 U.S.C. §§ 119–120.
19 37 C.F.R. § 1.53(b). The specification must describe the invention
and . . . the manner and process of making and using it, in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art
to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make
and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112. The claims must “particularly point[ ] out and distinctly claim[ ] the subject
matter which the applicant regards as his invention.” Id. When the patent grants, the
patentee’s rights are limited to what is described in the claims, and equivalents thereof. See
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 37–39 (1997).
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object to it.20 If a claim fails to meet a substantive legal requirement, then the
USPTO will reject it.21 If the USPTO rejects or objects to any claim, then the
Director shall notify the applicant thereof, stating the reasons for
such rejection, or objection or requirement, together with such
information and references as may be useful in judging of the
propriety of continuing the prosecution of his application; and
if after receiving such notice, the applicant persists in his claim
for a patent, with or without amendment, the application shall
be reexamined.22
If an application is free of objections or rejections, then the USPTO will send
the applicant a “notice of allowance,”23 and upon payment of the issue fee, will issue
the patent.24 Once issued, a patent is generally valid for twenty years after the date
of filing,25 so long as maintenance fees are paid.26 Once issued, patents generally
“have the attributes of personal property.”27
Applicants still in the queue have the option of filing a petition to make special,
which would allow the USPTO to advance the application out of turn.28 Common
reasons for filing such a petition include “the applicant’s age or health,” as well as
claims that the “invention will materially: (i) Enhance the quality of the environ-
ment; (ii) Contribute to the development or conservation of energy resources; or (iii)
Contribute to countering terrorism.”29 These petitions are rare, but are often granted
20 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 706.01 (8th ed., rev. 8 2010) [hereinafter MPEP].
21 See id.
22 35 U.S.C. § 132.
23 37 C.F.R. § 1.311.
24 Id. § 1.314.
25 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
26 37 C.F.R. § 1.362.
27 35 U.S.C. § 261.
28 37 C.F.R. § 1.102.
29 Id. § 1.102(c). Under the 1959 rules, the appropriate reasons for advancement out of
turn were far less specific; the regulations allowed advancement for “inventions . . . deemed
of peculiar importance to some branch of the public service.” Patents, Trademarks, and
Copyrights: Republication of Regulations, 24 Fed. Reg. 10,332, 10,340 (Dec. 22, 1959). In
1982, the rules were amended to provide that a petition to make special would be granted and
that no fee would be required if the invention “w[ould] materially enhance the quality of the
environment or materially contribute to the development or conservation of energy
resources.” Revision of Patent and Trademark Fees Confirmation, 47 Fed. Reg. 41,272 
(Sept. 17, 1982) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1, 2). The rule was then changed in 2004 to
include inventions relating to counterterrorism. Changes to Support Implementation of the
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office 21st Century Strategic Plan, 69 Fed. Reg. 56,482 (Sept. 21,
2004) (codified at 7 C.F.R. pts. 1, 5, 10, 41, 104).
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when based on the applicant’s age.30 The USPTO has also been trying to encourage
the advancement of patent applications that benefit the environment.31
B. The Proposed Change
1. Overview
In an attempt to get through its massive backlog, the USPTO is creating a more
formalized system for reviewing applications in a manner other than first-come,
first-served.32 Under the new system, applicants will be able to place their applica-
tions onto one of three “tracks.”33 Track II equates to “traditional examination under
the current procedures.”34 Track III will allow the applicant to intentionally delay
review of the application.35 Track I consists of “prioritized examination.”36 An
applicant must pay an additional fee to move an application to Track I.37 There are
certain other requirements designed to increase the speed at which applications can
be handled.38 For example, applications must be filed electronically and have fewer
than four independent claims and fewer than thirty claims total.39 The new priori-
tized application system has already been implemented,40 and the Director of the
USPTO has stated that he intends to cap the number of prioritized applications at
around 10,000.41
30 See Dennis Crouch, A First Look at USPTO Petitions Data, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 25,
2010, 4:56 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/10/a-first-look-at-uspto-petitions
-data.html.
31 See Press Release 09-33, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce,
The U.S. Commerce Department’s Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) Will Pilot a
Program to Accelerate the Examination of Certain Green Technology Patent Applications
(Dec. 7, 2009), available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2009/09_33.jsp.
32 See Amy Schatz, Patent Fast Track Proposed, WALL ST. J. (June 3, 2010), http://online
.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704515704575282951991894276.html.
33 Press Release 10-24, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, supra note 6.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 See id.
37 See Eilene Zimmerman, Business Owners Adjusting to Overhaul of Patent System,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2012, at B8.
38 See Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, USPTO Implements Prioritized Examination
(Track 1), PATENTLY-O (Feb. 21, 2011, 1:01 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/02
/uspto-implements-prioritized-examination-track-1.html.
39 Id.
40 Press Release 11-74, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce,
USPTO Updates Rules for “Track I” Fast Track Patent Processing (Dec. 19, 2011), 
available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2011/11-74.jsp.
41 Timothy J. Maier, USPTO Announces First Allowed Application Under New Pri-
oritized Examination (Track 1) Program, MAIER & MAIER PLLC (Nov. 4, 2011, 10:21 AM),
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2. Motives for the Change
a. Enhancing Speed
The USPTO believes that the change will help it process applications faster, and
will ultimately benefit all applicants.42 The theory is that those who pay to enter
Track I will be better served because their applications will be processed more
quickly.43 Those who enter Track III are given more time before their applications
are officially reviewed, thus giving the inventors more time to perfect their inventions
or determine if there is a sizeable enough market to make a patent worthwhile.44
Additionally, some applicants who are in Track III may decide to abandon their
applications, and can do so without the USPTO having spent significant resources
examining the application.45 Those who go through Track II, the system that was
formally used by all applicants, will benefit because their applications will have to
wait in a shorter queue once other applications leave for Track I or Track III.46 As
USPTO Director David Kappos explained, “There’s a component of this proposal
that a rising tide lifts all boats. . . . It’s like having someone in the butcher shop get
out of line in front of you.”47
While little has been written about the likely effects of the USPTO’s new
system, a tremendous amount has been written about a similar idea known as
“congestion pricing.”48 This is a system under which drivers are charged fees for
access to certain roadways.49 The idea is not novel; “[a]irlines and utilities have
used congestion or peak pricing for several decades to shift discretionary demand
to off-peak periods. For example, most long-distance telephone service is priced
only one-third as high on weekends as during business hours.”50 Congestion pricing
on roadways is obviously more similar to the USPTO’s new system than to these
http://www.postgrant.com/2011/11/uspto-announces-first-allowed-application-under-new 
-prioritized-examination-track-1-program.html.
42 Schatz, supra note 32.
43 See id.
44 See id.
45 See David Kappos, The Three-Track Proposal: Putting Applicants in Control of
Examination Timing, USPTO.GOV (June 15, 2010, 1:14 PM), http://www.uspto.gov/blog
/director/entry/the_three_track_proposal_putting.
46 Id.
47 Schatz, supra note 32.
48 See, e.g., JOHN F. MCDONALD ET AL., ECONOMICS OF URBAN HIGHWAY CONGESTION
AND PRICING (1999); U.S. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., OFFICE OF TRANSP. MGMT., CONGESTION
PRICING: A PRIMER (2006); Charles Komanoff, Pollution Taxes for Roadway Transportation,
12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 121 (1994); Jonathan Remy Nash, Economic Efficiency Versus
Public Choice: The Case of Property Rights in Road Traffic Management, 49 B.C. L. REV.
673 (2008).
49 Nash, supra note 48, at 708.
50 Komanoff, supra note 48, at 132.
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previous examples, because its goal is not to divert demand from peak- to off-peak
periods, but to allow certain applications to get through the process faster.51 San
Diego has been experimenting with a similar system, charging “single-occupant
vehicles for access to the road’s express lanes.”52 Although it is unclear how well the
system will work for the USPTO, congestion pricing on roadways has had clear
economic benefits and has increased efficiency.53
b. Prioritizing Certain Applications
As David Kappos explained, part of the reason for the proposed change is that
not all applications are equal. Since at least 2009, the USPTO has attempted to find
ways to bring “green” technology patents—i.e., patents that are expected to benefit
the environment—to market more quickly.54 In 2010, the USPTO experimented with
a green technology pilot program, which applied to the first 3,000 patent applicants
who applied for expedited review.55 While the aims of this program were noble, the
problem with this sporadic approach is that green technology often takes a long time
to develop, and is, in many ways, still in its infancy.56 Consequently, these sorts of
sudden bursts of awards for innovation may not properly incentivize the long-term,
dedicated investment that is needed.57 A set policy change implementing three tracks
with specific criteria for what will move an application from one track to another will
likely provide bigger incentives to invest in long-term green technology research.58
3. Criticism
The three-track system is not without its critics. Intuitively, it seems unfair to
allow certain applicants to pay extra to “cut in line.”59 It is also unlikely that an
application’s moving from Track II to Track I will benefit another application in
51 See Kappos, supra note 45.
52 Nash, supra note 48, at 714. Drivers may access the roads’ normal lanes, however, free
of charge. Id. London has a similar system, where people must choose either to pay for
roadway “access to the central city during the day,” or use public transportation, “which is
less expensive, [though] not free.” Id. at 713.
53 See id. at 725.
54 See Press Release 09-33, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, supra note 31.
55 Rieva Lesonsky, Get on the Fast Track to Green Tech Patents, SMALL BUSINESS
TRENDS (Jan. 11, 2010, 11:39 AM), http://smallbiztrends.com/2010/01/get-on-the-fast-track
-to-green-tech-patents.html.
56 See RON PERNICK & CLINT WILDER, THE CLEAN TECH REVOLUTION: THE NEXT BIG
GROWTH AND INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY 280 (2007).
57 See id.; Patrick Avato & Jonathan d’Entremont Coony, Accelerating Clean Energy
Technology Research, Development, and Deployment: Lessons from Non-energy Sectors
15–18 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 138, 2008).
58 See Avato & Coony, supra note 57, at 15–18.
59 See Nash, supra note 48, at 726 n.367 (discussing the concerns that the public tends
to have about congestion pricing, one of which is that it is “in one way or other, unfair”).
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Track II, given that the application that left the queue will still be examined before
the application that remained.60 Already, “[s]ome independent inventors have com-
plained that Mr. Kappos understands the needs of large companies better than start-
ups,” because large companies often have the financial resources to benefit from
prioritized examination whereas independent inventors often do not.61 In situations
in which congestion pricing is proposed, there is often a perception that revenue
from the program will simply find its way into government coffers.62 The USPTO
has stated that the extra revenue will only be used to pay for the additional cost of
priority examination,63 but it is unclear whether the public will believe this statement.
Others criticize the proposed change for not going far enough, arguing that the
government should utilize a multi-tier approach when determining patent terms and
patent rights, not just application speed.64 The basic argument is that factors such as
the speed of technological change in the industry and the benefit of the technology
to the public should influence the length of the patent term and its level of protec-
tion.65 While this argument may be persuasive, it does not necessarily detract from
the USPTO’s multi-track patent application queue system. 
The benefits of the USPTO’s proposed change are clear. A multi-track approach
that allows inventors to advance their applications should have economic benefits
similar to or the same as those associated with congestion pricing.66 Additionally,
providing a more stable understanding of how the USPTO will handle green tech-
nology patents should help spur investment in that technology.67 Although the
proposal will likely have critics who will attack the fairness of congestion pricing
regimes68 or believe that the proposal should go further,69 its likely benefits outweigh
60 But see Changes to Implement the Prioritized Examination Track (Track 1) of the
Enhanced Examination Timing Control Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. 6,369, 6,370 (Feb. 4, 2011)
(to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) (in which the USPTO explains that the added fees will be
used to pay for more examiners, thus allowing the USPTO to examine applications in Track
II equally as quickly despite prioritizing Track I applications).
61 See Schatz, supra note 32. Also, Kappos may be biased in favor of large inventive
companies because “[h]e was previously IBM Corp.’s top intellectual-property [sic] lawyer.” Id.
62 See Nash, supra note 48, at 726 n.367 (referring to the pricing system as a “tax”).
63 See Changes to Implement the Prioritized Examination Track (Track 1) of the
Enhanced Examination Timing Control Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. at 6,370 (“The prioritized
examination fee is being proposed to be set at a level to recover the full cost of the resources
necessary to increase the work output of the Office so that the non-prioritized applications
would not be delayed due to resources being diverted to process the prioritized applications.”).
64 See, e.g., Alexander I. Poltorak, Poltorak: Patent Reform Misses the Mark, WASH.
TIMES (May 25, 2010), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/may/25/patent-reform
-misses-the-mark/.
65 See id.
66 See Nash, supra note 48, at 725.
67 See Avato & Coony, supra note 57, at 15–18.
68 See Nash, supra note 48, at 726 n.367. See generally Schatz, supra note 32.
69 See generally Poltorak, supra note 64.
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its costs. Hence, if there is a constitutional problem that prohibits the USPTO from
implementing the proposal, it could have serious consequences.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE
A. Overview of the Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause forbids the taking of “private property
. . . for public use, without just compensation.”70 In addition to forcing the govern-
ment to pay just compensation for the taking of property, it also forbids the govern-
ment from taking “the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another
private party B, even though A is paid just compensation.”71 If a spot in the patent
application queue could be considered property, then granting a petition to make
special would raise considerable issues under this Clause. One could argue that
advancing one application out of turn would be taking property from the applicants
who were previously ahead of that applicant merely to give that property to someone
else. This would be unconstitutional, unless the government could show that there
was a public interest involved.72 If the government were able to show such a public
interest, that would still leave the issue of just compensation.73 Although it may
seem unusual to deem a spot in the patent application queue “property,” this would
be the logical conclusion if a future court were to follow the unusual and often-
criticized—though never overruled—Court of Federal Claims opinion in Tulare
Lake Basin v. United States.74
B. The Tulare Decision and Its Impact
1. Facts of the Case
The Tulare case concerned the “delta smelt and the winter-run chinook
salmon—two species of fish determined by the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service (‘USFWS’) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (‘NMFS’) to be in
jeopardy of extinction.”75 The case involved the intersection of “the Endangered
Species Act and California’s century-old regime of private water rights.”76
70 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
71 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005).
72 See id. at 476.
73 U.S. CONST. amend. V (permitting government takings for public use only so long as
just compensation is provided).
74 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001).
75 Id. at 314.
76 Id.
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Essentially, California’s water system must transport water from water-rich
northern California to other, more arid areas, such as the Central Valley.77 The
Tulare case concerned two water projects designed to facilitate this goal: the Central
Valley Project (CVP) and the State Water Project (SWP).78 The CVP is a federal
project and the SWP is a state project, but “the two projects share a coordinated
pumping system that requires, as a practical matter, that the systems be operated in
concert.”79 The managing agencies in charge of these projects “are granted water
permits by the State Water Resources Control Board (‘SWRCB’ or ‘the Board’)—a
state agency with the ultimate authority for controlling, appropriating, using and
distributing state waters.”80 These agencies then “contract with county water districts,
conferring on them the right to withdraw or use prescribed quantities of water.”81
The plaintiffs in Tulare all had either direct or subsidiary contracts giving them
a set allotment of water.82 The state cannot actually guarantee how much water will
ultimately fall in a given year, so the contracts “explicitly provide that the state will
not be held liable for shortages due to drought or other causes beyond its control.”83
In this way, the rights granted under these contracts seem like patent applications in
a queue. They do not necessarily guarantee anything, but establish that the contracting
party may be entitled to some right in the future, depending on the circumstances.84
With California’s water allocation system firmly rooted in place, the Endan-
gered Species Act was signed into law.85 This Act requires federal agencies “to
consult with the Secretary of the Interior or Commerce to ‘insure [sic] that any
action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopar-
dize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species.’”86
On February 14, 1992, the NMFS issued a biological opinion concluding that
the SWP and CVP were likely to jeopardize the population of winter-run chinook
salmon, an endangered species.87 The Service declared that it would be a “reason-
able and prudent alternative” to restrict the pumping of water, thereby reducing the
amount of water available for distribution.88 This was repeated the following year.89
Each year, the state implemented the Service’s recommendation.90 The plaintiffs in
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 315.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Cf. id.; supra Part I.
85 Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 315.
86 Id. (alteration in original) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994)).
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 316.
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Tulare, California water users, filed suit on the grounds that, in following the federal
agency’s recommendation, the state had taken the plaintiffs’ private property for
public use without just compensation.91
2. The Ruling
The Tulare court ultimately found that the federal government had taken the
plaintiffs’ property in order to serve a public interest.92 The court held that the
government had the power to do this, but was required to pay just compensation.93
The court based its ruling on United States v. Causby, an earlier case in which the
Supreme Court had ruled “that frequent flights immediately above a landowner’s
property constituted a taking, comparing such actions to a more traditional physical
taking.”94 In that case, the Supreme Court looked at whether the government’s
intrusion was “so immediate and direct as to subtract from the owner’s full enjoy-
ment of the property and to limit his exploitation of it.”95
When deciding how to apply Causby, the court referred to the unique nature of
water as property, mentioning that “the right of property in water is usufructuary,
and consists not so much of the fluid itself as the advantage of its use.”96 The court
reasoned that because the government’s action had prevented the plaintiffs from
using the water, it completely eviscerated the plaintiffs’ sole entitlement under their
contracts.97 The court concluded that the government had deprived the plaintiffs’
usufructuary rights of all value, and therefore had engaged in a physical taking.98
Because physical takings always require the payment of just compensation, the
government was required to pay.99
III. A HYPOTHETICAL CASE
A. Facts
In this hypothetical case, imagine that Alice the Inventor has invented a new
type of pencil sharpener. She files a patent application, and the USPTO assigns her
a filing date. Later, Bob the Inventor invents a new type of pencil sharpener that also
converts pencil shavings into an easily biodegradable fertilizer, thus having the
91 Id. at 314.
92 Id. at 324.
93 Id. at 318–19, 324.
94 Id. at 319 (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946)).
95 Id. (quoting Causby, 328 U.S. at 265).
96 Id. (quoting Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 252–53 (1853)).
97 Id.
98 Id. at 320.
99 See id. at 324.
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potential to contribute to soil restoration and hence materially enhance the quality
of the environment.100 Bob files a petition to make special, which is granted, and his
application is advanced ahead of Alice’s.
Subsequently, both Alice and Bob decide they would like to sell (assign) the
rights to their respective patent applications.101 Because Bob’s petition to make
special was granted, giving him an advanced position, he is able to charge a high
price when assigning the rights under the application. Alice, on the other hand, is
unable to find a buyer. This is because potential purchasers are afraid that it will take
too long for her patent to issue and that by the time it finally issues, Bob’s invention
will have dominated the market. Alice sues the USPTO, claiming that, by granting
Bob’s petition to make special, the USPTO has taken Alice’s property and given it
to Bob without paying just compensation as required by the Fifth Amendment.
B. The Legal Argument
A patent application does not seem like it would constitute property, because it
may or may not issue as an actual patent. Alice would argue, however, that the
contracts in Tulare appeared to be similarly situated. These contracts stipulated that
“[b]ecause the amount of water available . . . is largely a function of natural causes
. . . the permits explicitly provide[d] that the state will not be held liable for short-
ages due to drought or other causes beyond its control.”102 This means that the
plaintiffs in Tulare were not necessarily guaranteed anything under their contracts
except the expectation of possible water. This makes the Tulare plaintiffs seem like
patent applicants, who are not necessarily guaranteed anything, but nevertheless
have the expectation of a possible patent and are permitted to assign the future rights
to that patent.103
Alice would claim that the USPTO’s action completely eviscerated the eco-
nomic worth of her assignable interest. She would argue that, at least until the patent
100 To “materially enhance the quality of the environment,” the invention must contribute
“to (i) the restoration or maintenance of basic life sustaining elements, i.e., air, water, and soil
or (ii) development of fossil fuels, hydrogen fuel technologies, etc., or reduction of energy
consumption in combustion systems such as industrial equipment, household appliances, etc.”
David McEwing, Petitions to Make Special, HOUSTON INTERNET LAW, http://www
.houstoninternetlaw.com/patents/petitions-to-make-special.html (last visited May 1, 2012)
(citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.102(c) (2004)); see also Press Release 09-33, U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office, supra note 31 (explaining the USPTO’s motives for accelerating the examination of
patents that benefit the environment).
101 See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006) (“Applications for patent, patents, or any interest therein,
shall be assignable in law by an instrument in writing. The applicant, patentee, or his assigns
or legal representatives may in like manner grant and convey an exclusive right under his
application for patent, or patents, to the whole or any specified part of the United States.”).
102 Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 315.
103 See 35 U.S.C. § 261.
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issues, the complete economic worth of a patent application lies in its
assignability.104 She would draw parallels to Tulare, arguing that the government’s
action had voided a property interest, and was therefore a physical taking. She
would then argue that, because it is a physical taking, she should be automatically
entitled to just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.105
One may immediately think of several counterarguments. For example, the
government could point out that Alice’s patent application has not been canceled,
simply delayed, and that this is therefore a mere regulatory taking.106 One could also
point out that water is an inherently limited resource, whereas patents represent a
growing set of knowledge, so it does not make sense to think of the government’s
action in terms of a total evisceration of economic rights or a physical taking. One
could further argue that patents (or the right to a possible patent) simply cannot be
considered physical property because of their abstract nature. Finally, one could
point out that the government is not really taking anything so much as making a
decision about which application has a higher priority, and that it would be just as
much a “taking” if the USPTO were to examine Alice’s application before Bob’s,
even under a scheme that is first-come, first-served.107 These are all counterargu-
ments that will be addressed later in this Note, but first there is an obvious initial
hurdle that Alice must overcome. Alice must convince a court that Tulare applies.
C. An Initial Hurdle: Is Tulare Applicable?
For Alice’s use of Tulare to be persuasive, she would need to convince a court
that water rights are comparable to patent rights. A court might otherwise believe
that water rights and patent rights are too easily distinguishable, and hence not even
bother to look at Tulare. Patents are a statutory grant of rights connected to some-
thing produced by human thought and innovation. Water, on the other hand, is a
natural resource. At first glance, one might think that it would be difficult for Alice
to overcome this hurdle. Examining the origins of water rights and patent rights,
however, one might come to a different conclusion. Surprisingly, both areas of law
evolved to solve similar problems,108 and have similar symbolic underpinnings.109
104 See id.
105 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (holding that just
compensation is required any time the government engages in a physical taking).
106 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y. City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (holding that a
regulation that restricts use of the property, e.g., by preventing the construction of a high-rise
office building on top of a landmark train station, does not require the payment of just
compensation).
107 See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279–80 (1928) (holding that the government is
not required to compensate when it merely chooses one property over another).
108 See infra notes 110–51 and accompanying text.
109 See infra notes 152–68 and accompanying text.
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1. Both Water Rights Law and Intellectual Property Law Evolved out of
Concerns Regarding Over-Monopolization
To understand the concerns underlying water rights law and intellectual property
law, it is important to understand their histories. Much American law originates in
the English common law.110 Hence, to understand the origins both of American
water rights law and intellectual property law, it is useful to begin with an under-
standing of these rights’ places within the English common law.
Much like water itself, water rights law has been in a state of flux throughout
the history of England as different concerns regarding water rights have shifted in
priority.111 In the centuries leading up to the Medieval Era, England was essentially part
of the Roman Empire.112 Roman law, much influenced by animist concerns, required
that water be used in ways that might, in modern times, be seen as inefficient.113 For ex-
ample, Roman law typically required that irrigation take precedence over milling.114
Water was harnessed via large public projects and controlled centrally.115
With the fall of the Roman Empire, concerns shifted. The old animist views
gave way to the Judeo-Christian idea that “man, under God, must master and control
the natural world.”116 In this era, there was a significant fragmentation of power
compared to the centralized system of the Roman Empire.117 Newfound autonomous
communities appeared, often centered around individual manors or monasteries,
which would claim a monopoly with regard to the local area’s water supply.118 There
were a few scattered “free mills,” for which the ownership of the mill would be
divided among the local villagers, but these became rarer over time as feudal lords
zealously worked to consolidate their power.119 Holding a monopoly over an area’s
water supply would be highly profitable to a feudal lord, but this system was
unpopular among urban and rural workers.120 Such workers would often attempt to
evade the monopoly, despite “strenuous attempts at enforcement, and substantial
litigation in local and rural courts.”121 These workers would sometimes express their
displeasure using violence.122 Guilds, often thought of as powerful, attempted to get
110 See Graham Hughes, Common Law Systems, in FUNDAMENTALS OF AMERICAN LAW
9–25 (Alan B. Morisson ed., 1996).
111 See generally JOSHUA GETZLER, A HISTORY OF WATER RIGHTS AT COMMON LAW (2004).
112 See generally MALCOLM TODD, ROMAN BRITAIN (3d ed. 1999).
113 See GETZLER, supra note 111, at 13–14.
114 See id.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 17.
117 Id. at 16–17.
118 See id.
119 See id. at 20.
120 Id. at 21.
121 Id. at 20.
122 See id. at 21 (explaining how “many lords’ mills . . . were destroyed in the Peasants’
Revolt of 1381 and other popular insurrections”).
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legislation passed in opposition to “these swelling feudal monopolies which under-
mined urban trades; but with little success.”123
This tension was at a crisis point by 1800.124 All available sites where water
could be harnessed for power were occupied, significantly increasing the cost of
water power.125 Faced with this concern regarding the deleterious effects of monopo-
lization, “[t]he principle of undiminished natural flow evolved into the doctrine of
reasonable use, which allows all reasonable uses of water on the riparian tract, even
if natural flows are diminished.”126
It is clear that a major focus in this shift was concern regarding over-monopoli-
zation. Usually, owners of private property are not required to use their property in
ways that local customs, types of important competing uses, and the needs of others
make reasonable.127 Typically, private property owners are merely forbidden to use
their property in ways that hurt others.128 
A similar over-monopolization concern underpins patent law. At least since the
Biblical Era, there have been efforts to control the spread of information.129 Modern
American patent law, like most of the American legal system, can trace its history
to England.130 Much like English water rights law, the evolution of English patent
law reflects a shift in concerns.131
The original patent grants were very different from what we might think of as
patents today. In England during the Middle Ages, the monarch had the “royal
prerogative of granting letters patent.”132 These early grants would offer “protection
for foreigners willing to come to England to train his subjects in their respective
trades.”133 First granted in 1331, “these early letters patent functioned like passports
123 Id.
124 Id. at 40. To provide some historical perspective, James Watt began commercializing
his famous steam engine in 1775. IVOR BLASHKA HART, JAMES WATT AND THE HISTORY OF
STEAM POWER 203–06 (1949).
125 See GETZLER, supra note 111, at 40.
126 Sandra B. Zellmer & Jessica B. Harder, Unbundling Property in Water, 59 ALA. L.
REV. 679, 694 (2008).
127 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1337 (9th ed. 2009) (defining private property as
property “protected from public appropriation—over which the owner has exclusive and
absolute rights”).
128 See generally William L. Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV.
997 (1966) (explaining different situations in which the state may interfere with private
property rights by classifying certain uses as a nuisance).
129 See, e.g., 1 Samuel 13:19–21 (King James) (relating how the Phillistines kept the
Israelites from gaining information related to the forging of weapons).
130 See Frank D. Prager, Historic Background and Foundation of American Patent Law,
5 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 309, 311 (1961).
131 See infra notes 132–50.
132 Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History,
1550–1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1259 (2001).
133 Id.
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for any foreigners willing to come and establish their trade within the realm.”134 Thus,
the goal of these grants was to encourage foreigners to practice their trades in England
and, in the process, train Englishmen in such trades.135 These grants were intended
to grow new industries without harming existing industries, and were limited in
time.136 It is clear that the primary concern was not innovation, but importation.137
Though there was a clear goal for patent grants, Queen Elizabeth would often
abuse the royal prerogative, provoking the need for change.138 She issued several
patents which seemed to go against the original goal of encouraging the immigration
of foreigners with useful skills without harming existing workers.139 Instead of
granting monopolies to foreign tradesmen to enable them to practice their crafts in
England, Queen Elizabeth would grant these monopolies to English tradesmen as
a way of rewarding “long and faithful” service to her.140 Eventually, during the reign
of King James, Parliament passed the Statute of Monopolies, which served to define
and limit the authority over patents.141 The Statute of Monopolies was an express
attempt to restrict patent abuses.142 It is clear that this shift in the law came about
because of a concern regarding over-monopolization.143
American patent law also reflects this concern.144 The United States Constitution
explicitly states that the purpose of granting patents is “[t]o promote the Progress
of . . . useful Arts,” as opposed to rewarding faithful service.145 It also requires that
such grants be for a limited time.146 Under current United States patent law, the
patent holder may exclude others from utilizing the patented invention, thus claim-
ing a monopoly over the patented invention during the life of the patent.147 In current
134 Id. at 1259–60.
135 Id. at 1260–61.
136 Id. At the time, “employment was largely sacrosanct . . . and strong efforts were made
to avoid the granting of patent[s] . . . perceived to infringe on the livelihoods of established
workers.” Id. at 1263 (quoting Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United
States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 2), 76 J. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 849, 859
(1994)) (second and third alterations in original).
137 See id. at 1264.
138 Id. at 1264–66.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 1266.
141 Statute of Monopolies, 1624, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.).
142 See Prager, supra note 130, at 313.
143 See id. (noting that patents could be voided under the statute if they were “lacking in
novelty, or contrary to law, or mischievous to the state . . . or hurt of trade, or generally
inconvenient” (alteration in original)).
144 See infra notes 145–50 and accompanying text.
145 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
146 Id.
147 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006) (dictating that the patent holder may exclude others from
“making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or
importing the invention into the United States”).
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practice, however, it is often difficult to convince a court to grant injunctive relief
prohibiting an infringer from continuing to make or use the patented invention.148
Consequently, a patent holder’s effective relief is often limited to reasonable
royalties.149 A system in which others can make use of an invention so long as they
 pay reasonable royalties is very similar to the riparian system of water rights, where
others may make “reasonable use” of the water supply.150
Because Alice can show that water rights law and patent law both evolved to
address similar historical concerns, she should be able to persuade a court that a
decision concerning water rights is applicable in a situation involving patent applica-
tions. If a court is still not persuaded, however, Alice can discuss an additional similar-
ity between the two types of law: they share the same symbolic underpinnings.151
2. Symbolic Underpinnings of Water Rights and Intellectual Property Rights
Obviously, water is very unique when one thinks about its characterization as
property. It flows naturally, and it is something that people typically think of as
“using” rather than “possessing.”152 Water is “unlike any other natural resource or
thing.”153 This is partially because “[i]t is essential to all life.”154 From a property
law standpoint, water is unique because exclusive possession of a body of water, the
way one might exclusively possess another piece of property, is downright impossi-
ble.155 This is because water is in a constant state of flux, as it is moves, seeps,
148 See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (stating that,
even when patent infringement is proven, a permanent injunction should only be granted
when the plaintiff can show “(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury;
(3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy
in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent
injunction”).
149 See § 284; Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009). See
generally David M. Laspaluto, Reasonable Royalty Damages in the Wake of Lucent v.
Gateway: Better Guidance or More Confusion?, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Sept. 2010, at
28–30, available at http://www.perkinscoie.com/files/upload/IP_10_09_ReasonableRoyalty
Damages.pdf. Note that reasonable access to patented subject matter is also a feature of
major international intellectual property agreements. See, e.g., Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property, art. 5(a)(2), Mar. 20, 1883, 13 U.S.T. 2, 828 U.N.T.S. 107
(amended Sept. 28, 1979), available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs
_wo020.html; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e
/legal_e/27-trips_04c_e.htm.
150 See GETZLER, supra note 111, at 340 (discussing the “reasonable use doctrine”).
151 See infra notes 152–71 and accompanying text.
152 See GETZLER, supra note 111, at 2.
153 Zellmer & Harder, supra note 126, at 691.
154 Id.
155 See id.
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evaporates, and is consumed by plants and animals.156 Moreover, when it comes to
water, “[q]uantities are never entirely certain; drought, precipitation, and variable
human uses create ever-changing circumstances.”157
Similarly, patent rights are unique when characterized as property. A patent is
obviously intangible. The knowledge contained in a patent cannot be exclusively
owned, but is actually made public.158 The patent holder merely possesses the right
to exclude others from utilizing the claimed invention.159
When dealing with both water rights and patent rights, there is the concept of
a “natural flow” or “public domain”—something that cannot be exclusively owned
by anyone.160 Individuals may garner exclusive rights for set periods of time, but
must then return what they have taken back to nature or back to the public.161 This
idea is embodied in Locke’s articulation of property. As he explained:
Though the water running in the fountain be every one’s, yet
who can doubt but that in the pitcher is his only who drew it
out? His labour hath taken it out of the hands of nature, where it
was common, and belonged equally to all her children, and hath
thereby appropriated it to himself.162
As this quote explains, water naturally does not have an owner.163 One may, how-
ever, use one’s labor to appropriate some water, thereby becoming its owner, though
that water must ultimately be returned to nature.164
An almost identical concept exists in patent law. No invention is truly unique.165
Inventors take from a pool of available knowledge, and must cite their references
when filing for a patent.166 Like with water, patent holders may only keep their
156 Id.
157 Id. at 691–92.
158 See 35 U.S.C. § 10 (2006).
159 See id. § 154(a)(1).
160 Compare GETZLER, supra note 111, at 2, with HENRY C. MITCHELL JR., THE
INTELLECTUAL COMMONS: TOWARD AN ECOLOGY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1 (2005).
161 Id.
162 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION 16 (J.W. Gough ed., Basil Blackwell 1948) (1690).
163 See id.
164 Id.
165 Isaac Newton invoked this concept when he famously quipped, “If I have seen farther,
it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.” Stephen Hawking, Isaac Newton (1642–1727):
His Life and Work, in ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS 725 (Stephen Hawking ed., 2002).
166 See MPEP, supra note 20, § 1.56; see also Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, Citing
References to the USPTO, PATENTLY-O (July 13, 2010, 10:23 AM), http://www.patentlyo
.com/patent/2010/07/my-entry.html (describing how the average number of references cited
has fluctuated over time).
2012] THE NATURAL FLOW OF IDEAS 1391
exclusive property for a limited amount of time.167 After this period of time, the
knowledge returns to its natural state, usable by everyone without restriction.168
There is a distinction, however, that may make this argument unpersuasive for
Alice. One of the reasons for patent laws is to encourage the creation of more
knowledge and the advancement of technological progress.169 Ultimately, more
knowledge is returned to the public domain than was originally taken from it.170 In
fact, one of the motives behind patent law is to encourage inventors to make knowl-
edge public that would otherwise have remained secret.171 Water rights law, on the
other hand, is clearly not designed to incentivize the creation of new water. Water
taken must ultimately be returned to nature, but it is not the case that more water is
returned than was originally taken.
This casts doubt on whether Alice will be able to persuade a court that a water
rights decision should impact patent law by pointing to the symbolic underpinnings
of water rights law and patent law. Nevertheless, the similarities may be too much
for a court to ignore, and Alice can still show that the histories of the two types of
law are intertwined.172 Consequently, she should be able to overcome the initial
hurdle of convincing a court that Tulare should apply to a situation involving patent
law. This will not be the end of Alice’s struggle, however, as the USPTO will likely
present several counterarguments.
D. Counterarguments
There are several arguments that the USPTO could raise in opposition to Alice’s
argument. This Note will address what are likely to be the four biggest ones. First,
the USPTO could argue that it has merely delayed Alice’s application, not canceled
it, and has therefore engaged in a “regulatory” taking as opposed to a physical
taking.173 Second, the USPTO could argue that Tulare’s reasoning should not apply
because water is something inherently limited, whereas the USPTO may grant an
167 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (imposing a constitutional requirement that patent
grants be for a “limited time”); see also 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2010) (limiting the term of
patents to twenty years from date of filing). But see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003)
(holding that, at least with regard to copyrights, Congress may constitutionally extend the
protection term, thus casting doubt on whether such protection truly is for a “limited time”).
168 See id.
169 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries”).
170 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (requiring that inventions be novel in order to be patentable).
171 See id. § 102 (providing incentives for inventors to patent their inventions rather than
keeping them secret).
172 See supra Part III.C.1.
173 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y. City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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indefinite number of patents. Third, the USPTO could argue that patent applications
simply cannot be physical property because of their abstract nature. Fourth, the
USPTO could argue that it is simply making decisions as to priority, and that, if
Tulare is found to be applicable to Alice’s case, any decision concerning the order
of application processing could be considered a “taking” by those whose applications
are not processed immediately.174
1. This Is a Mere “Regulatory” Taking
The USPTO may counterargue that Alice’s case is distinguishable from Tulare
because her case involves a mere delay. In Tulare, the government actually pre-
vented the plaintiffs from using water they would otherwise have been entitled to
use.175 In this case, the USPTO has not actually prevented Alice’s application from
issuing as a patent, nor has the USPTO prevented her from assigning her rights
under the application. This is not the same as a situation involving water rights, or
another type of physical object, where appropriating the property somewhere else
prevents the holder of the rights in question from actually using them.176 To use the
language of the Tulare court, “the government has essentially substituted itself as
the beneficiary of the contract rights with regard to that water and totally displaced
the contract holder.”177 Essentially, the USPTO would be claiming that Alice’s
argument could only be valid in a scenario in which an application actually issues
as a patent. The USPTO could further argue that it has not deprived Alice of all of
her economically valuable rights in the patent application because she still has the
right to ultimately receive a valid patent and still has the right to assign the application,
albeit at a lower cost.178 Alice would respond by claiming that by advancing Bob’s
application out of turn simply because it may enhance the quality of the environ-
ment, a government policy goal, the government has “substituted itself as the
beneficiary” of her earlier patent filing.179
174 See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 280 (1928) (holding that it is not a taking when
the government is forced to choose between an “unavoidable” taking of one of two types of
property).
175 Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 319–20 (2001).
176 Id. at 319 (“In the context of water rights, a mere restriction on use . . . completely
eviscerates the right itself since plaintiffs’ sole entitlement is to the use of the water.”).
177 Id.
178 See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (holding that it is not a constitutional taking
to outlaw the sale of certain artifacts while permitting the transportation and possession of
those artifacts because the government did not deprive the owners of all their economically
valuable rights in the property). But see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)
(holding that a regulation that eliminates all economic use of a piece of property can
constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment).
179 Id.
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In determining whether or not a restriction on property constitutes a taking, it
is important to keep in mind that the purpose of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause is “to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole.”180 Alice would be arguing that the government gets something of value from
advancing Bob’s application out of turn, namely the potential for improved environ-
mental quality, but that she alone must bear the burden because her assignable patent
rights are economically worthless. The Supreme Court “has been unable to develop
any ‘set formula’ for determining when ‘justice and fairness’ require that economic
injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than
remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.”181 Instead, the Court has
generally conducted ad hoc inquiries based on the circumstances of each individual
case.182 It is also important to note that a taking does not necessarily occur every
time government actions “adversely affect recognized economic values,” because
“[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.”183
On the other hand, a nonregulatory, physical taking always entitles the property
owner to just compensation, “no matter how minute the intrusion.”184
Alice would counterargue that, under Tulare, the government has engaged in a
physical taking, as opposed to a regulatory taking. This argument may seem
counterintuitive, but the Tulare court ultimately found that the government had
engaged in a physical taking by depriving the contract holders of their water
rights,185 even though the water rights are not necessarily physical objects, and by
law the physical water itself always belonged to the people of California.186 The
court was guided in its reasoning by a Supreme Court decision in which the govern-
ment acquired a corporation’s right to water power.187 The Supreme Court’s reason-
ing in that case was that the government had fully deprived the corporation of the
use of the water at issue, and thus had effected a physical taking.188
In this light, it does not seem impossible that a future court would classify the
taking of patent rights as a physical taking.
180 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
181 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y. City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
182 Id.
183 Id. (citing Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)).
184 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
185 Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 319 (2001).
186 Id. at 318 n.5 (citing CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (Deering 1977)).
187 See id. (citing Int’l Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399, 404 (1931)).
188 Id. at 319 (“[T]he petitioner’s right was to the use of water; and when all the water that
it used was withdrawn from the petitioner’s mill and turned elsewhere by government
requisition for the production of power it is hard to see what more the Government could do
to take that use.” (quoting Int’l Paper Co., 282 U.S. at 407)).
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2. Water Is Distinct from Patents Because Water Is Inherently Limited
The USPTO could argue that there is a major distinction between water rights
and patent rights that may preclude their comparison when thinking about what
constitutes a “taking.” Water is something that is inherently limited. This effectively
makes water distribution a zero-sum game. Traditionally, the same is not necessarily
true for intellectual property. Thomas Jefferson explained that ideas are the things
least susceptible to individual ownership because, once divulged, an idea “forces
itself into the possession of every one, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of
it.”189 Moreover, ideas, unlike tangible property, can be shared without diluting their
value. Jefferson used the metaphor of a candle to explain this concept, stating, “He
who receives an idea from me, receives instruction without lessening mine; as he
who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.”190 On this basis,
Jefferson believed that “[i]nventions . . . cannot, in nature, be a subject of property.”191
This argument highlights an important distinction between water rights and
patent rights: whereas there is only a fixed supply of water, an idea can be shared
infinitely.192 While this line of reasoning may apply to intellectual property in
general, it does not automatically preclude the comparison of a place in the patent
queue to rights under a contract for water.193 While it may be possible to share an
idea indefinitely, the number of patent examiners is still inherently limited.194
Consequently, the number of patent applications that can be examined at a given
time is inherently limited, so examining a given patent application out of turn does
remove the ability to examine another application at the same time, meaning that the
patent examination queue ultimately does have the properties of a zero-sum game.
3. A Patent Application Simply Cannot Be Physical Property
In a similar vein, the government could argue that a patent could absolutely
never be a form of physical property because of its abstract nature. Alice might
189 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), available at http://
press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_8s12.html.
190 Id.; see also MITCHELL, supra note 160, at 23 n.8 (explaining that “[t]he metaphor of
the taper is a classic example from the poet Ennius which was also used by Cicero, Seneca,
and Grotius”).
191 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, supra note 189.
192 But see MITCHELL, supra note 160, at 14 (listing the arguments for strong intellectual
property protection despite the fact that an idea can be shared so easily without diminishing
its value).
193 See id.
194 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PERFORMANCE
AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 11 (2009), available at http://www
.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2009/2009annualreport.pdf (providing details about the number
of examiners).
2012] THE NATURAL FLOW OF IDEAS 1395
refute this by pointing to Tulare, where the court held that contracts for water were,
in fact, physical property.195 A contract for water rights does connect to something
physical: water. Likewise, a patent must be connected to something in the physical
world.196 An invention that is completely abstract and not at all connected to the
physical world would not be patentable.197 For example, the Supreme Court has held
that no one may patent the idea of hedging risk, because risk hedging is an abstract
concept.198 Additionally, the Court has held that no one may patent a mathematical
formula used to convert one type of number to another, even if that formula was
very useful when implemented by a computer.199 In fact, even if a mathematical
formula is implemented on a digital computer and is part of a much larger machine
used for curing rubber (something that seems much closer to the physical world), it
still would not be patentable.200 Because a patent must be somehow connected to the
physical world, it would not make sense to say that a patent could never be considered
physical property because of its abstract nature.201 This is especially true if one were
to accept that it is possible for water rights to be considered physical property.202
4. This Case Is More Analogous to Miller than Tulare: The USPTO Is Forced to
Choose Between Two Classes of Property
Finally, the USPTO could argue that granting a petition to make special would
be analogous to the situation in Miller v. Schoene.203 In that case the plaintiff was the
owner of a large number of “ornamental red cedar trees,”204 a species that may be
host to cedar rust.205 The defendant, a state entomologist, found the plaintiff’s trees
195 Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 317–19 (2001).
196 See infra notes 197–201 and accompanying text.
197 See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (holding that the concept of hedging
risk is not patentable); LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852) (“[A] principle is not
patentable. A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive;
these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.”).
198 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3222.
199 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (holding that an algorithm for converting
binary-coded decimal numbers into binary numbers is not patentable).
200 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); see also Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584
(1978) (holding that a mathematical algorithm used for catalytic conversion is not patentable).
201 But see Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3221–22 (holding that the fixed “machine-or-transformation”
test for determining patentability is not exclusive, thus leaving open the possibility that a
future invention might be patentable without a connection to the physical world).
202 See Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 319 (2001).
203 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
204 Id. at 277.
205 Id. at 278–79 (“[C]edar rust is an infectious plant disease in the form of a fungoid
organism which is destructive of the fruit and foliage of the apple, but without effect on the
value of the cedar. Its life cycle has two phases which are passed alternately as a growth on
red cedar and on apple trees. It is communicated by spores from one to the other over a
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to be infected, so he lawfully ordered the plaintiff to destroy them.206 In failing to
find a constitutional problem or require just compensation, the Supreme Court
ruled that:
[T]he state was under the necessity of making a choice between
the preservation of one class of property and that of the other
wherever both existed in dangerous proximity. It would have
been none the less a choice if, instead of enacting the present
statute, the state, by doing nothing, had permitted serious injury
to the apple orchards within its borders to go on unchecked.
When forced to such a choice the state does not exceed its con-
stitutional powers by deciding upon the destruction of one class
of property in order to save another which, in the judgment of
the legislature, is of greater value to the public.207
The USPTO could argue that the Miller reasoning should apply in Alice’s
situation. The USPTO cannot possibly examine all applications simultaneously, and
must make decisions as to priority. Consequently, the USPTO is forced to decide
which patent applications should be examined first, and in this case chose Bob’s. As
in Miller, the government must make choices about what type of property is more
important.208 Even if the USPTO decided never to grant any petitions to make
special, that would still be making a decision about which patent applications should
be first to turn into patents. While the most obvious way of deciding might be a first-
come, first-served basis, it is still perfectly reasonable to say that patents that
“materially . . . [e]nhance the quality of the environment” or “[c]ontribute to coun-
tering terrorism” are more valuable to the public than other types of patents.209
Utilizing the Miller reasoning, it is also clear that granting petitions to make
special would not be taking “the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring
it to another private party B.”210 In Miller, the government could not avoid deciding
to prioritize one type of property over another as a result of natural causes.211
radius of at least two miles. It appears not to be communicable between trees of the same
species but only from one species to the other, and other plants seem not to be appreciably
affected by it. The only practicable method of controlling the disease and protecting apple
trees from its ravages is the destruction of all red cedar trees, subject to the infection, located
within two miles of apple orchards.”).
206 Id. at 277.
207 Id. at 279.
208 Id.
209 37 C.F.R. § 1.102 (2010). This argument might not be as persuasive when a petition
to make special is granted because of characteristics of the patent applicant, e.g., because of
the applicant’s age or health.
210 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005).
211 Miller, 276 U.S. at 279–80.
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Similarly, the USPTO cannot avoid prioritizing certain applications over others.
Again, this is through no fault of its own, but is instead a natural consequence of the
USPTO having limited examination resources at its disposal.212
CONCLUSION
The USPTO probably does not need to worry about litigation under the Takings
Clause when granting petitions to make special, but it risks litigation when imple-
menting its new three-track proposal.
While there is a chance that Tulare may be persuasive to a future court faced
with litigation over a petition to make special, this is unlikely given the criticism the
decision has sustained and the decision in Miller.213 Still, a future plaintiff could
probably overcome the initial hurdle of convincing a court that there is enough of
a connection between water rights and patent rights to consider Tulare persuasive.
Pointing to the histories of these rights and their symbolic underpinnings, this might
actually be the easy part for a plaintiff.214
In addition, such a plaintiff could probably overcome the most intuitive counter-
arguments. She could overcome the argument that petitions to make special are
regulatory takings by pointing out that she has been totally deprived of the economic
worth of her place in the queue.215 She could overcome the argument that water
rights are distinct from intellectual property rights because water is inherently
limited by pointing out that the USPTO’s examination resources are also inherently
limited.216 She could overcome the argument that a spot in the patent queue simply
cannot be physical property because it is plainly intangible by pointing out that all
patents must be connected to the physical world somehow.217
Despite all this, the USPTO would have an enormous trump card in Miller.218
It is simply too easy for the USPTO to argue that, because it cannot examine all
applications simultaneously, it must make decisions about priority. Unless the
Supreme Court overturns Miller, the USPTO likely does not have anything to worry
about when granting petitions to make special.
When proceeding with the new three-track system, however, Miller may not be
so helpful. Miller dealt with a situation in which the government needed to make a
212 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 194,
at 17, 19–20 (providing details on the resources of the USPTO).
213 See Miller, 276 U.S. at 280; supra note 14 and accompanying text.
214 See supra Part III.C.1–2.
215 See supra Part III.D.1.
216 See supra Part III.D.2.
217 See supra Part III.D.3.
218 See Miller, 276 U.S. at 280 (stating that when the choice between the two types of
property is unavoidable, “we cannot say that its exercise, controlled by considerations of
social policy which are not unreasonable, involves any denial of due process”).
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decision as to priority between two types of property, and chose to preserve one over
the other.219 This is directly analogous in a situation in which the USPTO grants a
petition to make special based on an important public policy goal, such as protection
of the environment or counterterrorism,220 but is less analogous in a situation in
which one applicant simply pays more money to receive prioritized examination.221
The USPTO could point out that there are other requirements besides payment of
extra money (e.g., required electronic filing and limits on the number of claims) and
could argue that no one truly has been made worse off because the extra revenue
raised through prioritized examination is used to pay for extra examination re-
sources, thus helping all patents to issue more quickly.222 It is unclear, however,
whether this counterargument would be persuasive given the intuitive hostility to
congestion pricing discussed in Part I.B.3 (i.e., the intuitive unfairness of allowing
one applicant to pay extra to cut in line and the general perception that extra money
raised will not actually benefit other applicants). On the other hand, prior courts
have upheld agency regulations that distributed scarce government-controlled
resources to applicants based entirely on the applicant’s ability to pay.223
If the government is concerned about being sued, it does have some options. For
example, the USPTO could require that applicants seeking prioritized examination
somehow show that their inventions benefit the public.224 In addition to removing
any constitutional concern under the Fifth Amendment, this change could help to
reduce the public perception of unfairness discussed in Part I.B.3.
If the USPTO wants to go ahead without adding any additional requirements,
but is still concerned about being sued, Congress could simply implement a plan for
payment of compensation similar to the current system by which patent applications
are placed under secrecy orders.225 Currently, if a patent grant or patent application
publication might, “in the opinion of the head of [an] interested Government agency,
be detrimental to the national security,” then the application may be placed under
a secrecy order.226 Once a secrecy order is imposed, the inventor is prohibited from
219 See id. at 279.
220 37 C.F.R. § 1.102 (2010).
221 See Changes to Implement the Prioritized Examination Track (Track 1) of the
Enhanced Examination Timing Control Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. 6,369 (Feb. 4, 2011) (to
be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
222 See id.; Crouch & Rantanen, supra note 38.
223 See, e.g., FCC v. Nextwave Pers. Commc’ns, Inc. (In re Nextwave Pers. Commc’ns,
Inc.), 200 F.3d 43, 46, 51 (2d Cir. 1999) (upholding the FCC’s regulatory authority to
allocate parts of the radio spectrum based on competitive bidding and to withdraw licenses
based on the licensee’s ability to pay).
224 The USPTO is already trying something similar to this with its green technology pilot
program. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.b.
225 See infra notes 229–34 and accompanying text.
226 35 U.S.C. § 181 (2006).
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discussing the subject matter of the invention.227 These orders cannot last for more
than one year, but can be renewed indefinitely.228 Congress has implemented a
procedure for any applicant who feels that he is entitled to “compensation for the
damage caused by the order of secrecy and/or for the use of the invention by the
Government, resulting from his disclosure.”229 This only applies to patent applica-
tions that are ultimately allowed, not to patent applications generally.230 The proce-
dure allows the head of the department or agency that recommended the secrecy
order to enter into negotiations with the inventor, or his heirs and assigns, to settle
the matter.231 If the inventor settles, he gives up his rights to sue.232 Otherwise, the
head of the department or agency may select what he feels is just compensation, pay
the inventor seventy-five percent of that sum, and permit the inventor to sue for the
balance the inventor believes he is owed.233 Effectively, this forces inventors to
accept less than they would otherwise be entitled to, unless they have “the patience,
the money, and the evidence required to outlast the United States in court.”234
If the government is truly concerned, then it could implement a similar proce-
dure for petitions to make special. Congress could give the Director of the USPTO,
or the head of another department or agency, the authority to negotiate with an
applicant in the event that an applicant feels wronged because a rival inventor’s
petition to make special was granted (or was selected for prioritized examination,
now that the USPTO has implemented that part of its three-track proposal). Congress
could also decide that, should negotiations fail, the department head would have the
authority to decide upon just compensation. Congress could further mandate that the
inventor be paid a fixed percentage of that figure. This procedure could allow the
USPTO to grant petitions to make special without fear of potentially costly litigation,
knowing that most aggrieved parties would be willing to give up their right to sue
in exchange for a compensatory payment.
This procedure, however, would not likely be good as a matter of public policy,
because it would create perverse incentives. If the USPTO had to pay an applicant
every time another application was advanced out of turn, an unscrupulous inventor
227 Id. § 186 (prescribing a penalty for disclosure of the invention).
228 Id. § 181. If a secrecy order is issued during a time of war, however, then it lasts until
one year following the cessation of hostilities. Id. If it is issued during a national emergency,
then it lasts until six months after the national emergency is over. Id.
229 Id. § 183. But see Adam J. Citrin, Note, Are the Secrecy Order Compensation
Provisions of the Patent Act Constitutional Under the Fifth Amendment?, 1 AKRON INTELL.
PROP. J. 275 (2007) (raising numerous reasons why the current system for granting
compensation in such cases may be unconstitutional).
230 See 35 U.S.C. § 183.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Citrin, supra note 229, at 294.
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who knows that his invention is not worth very much might try to intentionally delay
his application in the patent queue so as to keep receiving “just compensation.”235
This delay could worsen the already massive backlog of unexamined patents and
would soak up valuable USPTO resources, thus preventing worthwhile inventions
from coming to market in a timely manner. Consequently, considering that the risk
of being sued for just compensation is minimal, it would not be good public policy
for the government to implement such a procedure, even though it could potentially
save the government future litigation expenses.
Ultimately, the USPTO should continue proceeding with its proposed changes
to the queue system and should continue granting petitions to make special. It is
extremely unlikely that an applicant could successfully bring suit for just compensa-
tion based on a petition to make special, despite what one might think after reading
Tulare. It is also good public policy to ensure that inventions that benefit the public
are brought to market sooner.236 There is still a chance that a suit for just compensa-
tion based on the three-track system would succeed, but the USPTO can reduce this
risk by making certain changes, discussed in this Note’s Conclusion. The USPTO
still has many problems, including a massive backlog,237 but it does not need to
worry about a Fifth Amendment suit based on the grant of a petition to make special.
235 Even without this added incentive, the USPTO is concerned about applicants
intentionally delaying their applications, and has taken steps to address these concerns. See
generally Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations,
84 B.U. L. REV. 63 (2004).
236 See Citrin, supra note 229, at 298.
237 See Rubin, supra note 3.
